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          In this study, we empirically test whether pegged regime was successful in achieving 
and maintaining consistently low inflation rates in 17 MENA countries over the period of 
1980-2007.  Taking  into  account  unobserved  country  heterogeneity,  as  well  as,  the 
endogeneity of exchange rate regimes we estimate a dynamic panel data model of the effects 
of exchange rate regimes on inflation using officially announced exchange rate regimes in 
addition to de facto regimes in place. Our findings suggest a strong link between the choice of 
the exchange rate regime and inflation performance.   
The disjunction between de jure and de facto policies yields different results. De jure fixed 
exchange rate was not successful in assuring low and stable inflation rates as theoretically 
supposed  because  of  a  lacks  of  credibility.  On  the  contrary,  inflation  is  found  to  be 
considerably lower under de facto fixed regime. A robustness test account for discrepancies 
between the de jure IMF and the de facto regimes of Reinhart and Rogoff (2007), and Levy-
Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  (2005)  shows  that  credible  commitment  to  fixed  exchange  rate 
system  or  a  fear  of  floating  behavior  were  significantly  associated  with  better  inflation 
performance. 
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         Cette étude examine empiriquement si le régime de change fixe a effectivement permis 
d’atteindre et de maintenir un taux d'inflation faible dans les pays de MENA  sur la période de 
1980-2007. Tenant compte de l'hétérogénéité non observée pays, ainsi que, l'endogénéité des 
régimes de change, nous estimons un modèle dynamique de données de panel de l’effet de  
régimes de taux de change sur l'inflation en fonction de l’annonce officielle des autorités  et 
les pratiques de facto. Nos résultats suggèrent un lien étroit entre le choix du régime de taux 
de change et d'inflation.  
La disjonction entre les politiques de change de jure et celles de facto donne des résultats 
différents. Le régime de change fixe (de jure) n'a pas assuré un taux d'inflation faible et stable 
comme aurait dû théoriquement parce que il manque la crédibilité. 
Au contraire, le régime fixe de facto a entraîné une baisse considérable des taux d’inflation. 
Un test de robustesse qui prend en compte les divergences entre les régimes de jure (FMI) et 
ceux de facto de Reinhart et Rogoff (2007) et de Levy-Yeyati et Sturzenegger (2005) montre 
que l'engagement crédible au système de taux de change fixe ou un comportement de  crainte 
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1.     Introduction 
 
           Over the past decades, MENA has experienced several inflationary shocks. To deal 
with price volatility and to curb inflation, many MENA countries have chosen the policy of 
fixed exchange rates as the preferred policy anchor. The reasoning was that by pegging their 
national  currencies  to  a  strong  currency  (principally  to  the  US  dollar)  they  could  import 
credibility and confidence to their economies. But in doing so, the central banks lose control 
of domestic monetary policy.  However, the underdeveloped monetary institutions in MENA 
appear to undermine the successful use of discretionary monetary policy. More importantly, 
concerns related to the fear of floating hypothesis of Calvo and Reinhart, (2002) and to the 
domestic original sin hypothesis of Eichengreen and Hausmann, (1999) have made countries 
in MENA reluctant to fluctuation in nominal exchange rate.
1  So fixed exchange rate regime - 
beyond the limits of its sustainability- seems, in practice, a logical choice for MENA. 
 
In the  early  1990s, some MENA countries, while ensuring reforms, have moved towards 
greater exchange rate flexibility. In latest recent years, countries with greater exchange rate 
flexibility seem to hold relatively well in term of inflation performance.
2 The subsequent 
dollar depreciations since early 2002 and the run-up of USA’s inflation rate and world market 
price explosion have exacerbated domestic inflation level in MENA countries with fixed peg 
to the dollar. In light of this recent experience, an increasing number of economists have come 
to question the appropriateness of dollar peg in assuring price stability in MENA advising, 
instead, a gradual shift to a more flexible exchange rate arrangements such a peg to a basket 
of currencies.  
 
Several  influential  papers  have  tried  to  assess  the  relationship  between  the  choice  of  a 
particular exchange rate regime and inflation using worldwide sample countries. Obtained 
results  were  highly  dependent  on  sample  selection,  methods  of  estimation  and  on  the 
classification used, making it difficult to establish a clear cut link between exchange rate 
                                                 
1 The flexibility of exchange may be an independent source of inflation for countries that are more open (higher 
pass-through from exchange rate to inflation), with high liability dollarization or with high ratio of debt in 
foreign currency. 
2 Several countries, Turkey, Egypt, have put in place, more recently, an inflation targeting frameworks or some 
form  of  this  monetary  policy  framework  while  other  MENA  countries  such  as  Morocco  and  Tunisia  have 
implicitly targeted inflation, and have progressively moved towards an inflation-targeting regime. (See Neaime 
2008 for more detail).  
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regime and inflation opening, however, an empirical question pertaining the existence of a 
possible relationship in a specific region.  
 
In this paper we depart from many  existing empirical studies in an attempt to assess the 
relative importance of the link between exchange rate regimes and inflation in MENA region 
for 1980 - 2007 periods. Most countries in MENA have been keeping for a long time a quasi-
fixed exchange rate regime making this region an interesting case study that could provide 
some empirical evidence about the link between exchange rates and inflation. Subsequently, 
this  may  also  helps  to  inform  policies  on  the  appropriate  exchange  rate  policy  to  be 
implemented. 
 
The recent inflation experience of MENA, partly due to the dollar’s weakness, has received 
relatively higher attention and the research for alternative exchange rate arrangements has 
regained  importance.  However,  to  our  knowledge,  only  one  study,  this  of  El-Achkar  and 
Shahin (2009), tried to evaluate the experience 18 MENA counties with pegged regimes over 
the  1975-2005  periods  using  pooled  OLS  estimation.  These  authors  use  IMF’s  de  jure 
classification as well as the de facto classification of Bubula Otker-Robe (2002) to perform 
their estimation. Their results reveal no significant link between exchange rate regime and 
inflation irrespective of the applied method of classification. Further, in order to assess the 
robustness of their result, they re-estimate their model for subsample of MENA countries 
(Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), North African and other MENA countries), but their main 
results remain unchanged.    
 
This paper improves upon the evidence presented by El-Achkar and Shahin (2009) in four 
dimensions: 1/ we present evidence for a more recent sample period from 1980 to 2007. 2/ we 
use  the  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2007),  and  Levy-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  (2005)  de  facto 
classification besides to the de jure classification of the IMF.  3/ as de jure fixed exchange rate 
may  fall  short  of  credibility  ,  we  also  try  to  differentiate  between  countries  that  keep  a 
credible pegged regime and those that are not by matching de jure with de facto exchange rate 
policies.  This  reflects  the  extent  to  which  political  and  institutional  factors  impact  the  
formation of expectations therefore country inflation performance.
3 4/ unlike El-Achkar and 
                                                 
3 For example, several countries in our sample are small open economies, that maintain a credible fixed rate and 
so these countries are expected to have very different inflation dynamic from the large, mostly closed economies   5 
Shahin, we also address the issue of exchange rate regime endogeneity which may be of 
important  concern  when  assessing  exchange  rates  stability  impact  on  country  inflation 
performance. Our findings suggest a strong link between the choice of  the exchange rate 
regime and inflation performance.  
  
The  reminder  of  this  paper  consists  of  the  following  sections:  section  2  reviews  some 
empirical  studies  conducted  on  the  relationship  between  the  nature  of  the  exchange  rate 
regime  and  inflation  performance.  Section  3  uncovers  some  stylised  facts  about  inflation 
behaviour  in  our  sample  period,  focusing  briefly  on  inflation  performance  under  various 
exchange  rate  regimes  classifications.  Section  4  presents  the  model  and  the  testing 
methodologies employed, the results obtained and discuses the impact of discrepancy and/or 
consistency between de jure and de facto policies on inflation outcome.  Finally, section 5 
concludes. 
 
2     Inflation Performance and Exchange Rate Regime: some 
theoretical and empirical insight 
 
The direct impact of exchange rate regime on inflation performance is related to the 
role of exchange rate anchor in addressing the credibility deficit of monetary authorities in 
countries with high inflation rate. Pegging the exchange rate (typically vis a vis the dollar) 
could influence inflation expectations that, inasmuch as the peg is credible, would lead to 
lower  inflation  rates.  Fixed  exchange  rate,  being  a  highly  visible  commitment,  provides 
incentives for high macroeconomic and financial performance so as to maintain confidence in 
the fixed exchange rate, especially if political costs of loose monetary and fiscal policies are 
high, Obstfield and Rogoff (1995), Ghosh et al (1996, 1997). 
 
Underlying this credibility hypothesis, there is the time inconsistency argument by which high 
inflation expectations induce high inflation equilibria with steep nominal interest rates that, in 
turn, make it optimal for the government to dilute its debt burden through inflation, generating 
                                                                                                                                                         
that did not keep a such credible fixed regime or who manifest an apparent desirability to stable exchange rate 
but at the same time allow more flexible response in time of pressure.   
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an inflation bias. The credibility and the macroeconomic discipline, that fixed rate regime is 
supposed to bring, are hence neither automatic nor guaranteed.
4 
 
In spite of the theoretical link, empirical evidence was more elusive and rather tended to support 
the case for fixed exchange rate regime. Such relation is found, however, highly dependant on a 
host of factors. Examples include the quality of institution that varies across countries; the level 
of details in the regime classification, as the classification schemes by which each researchers 
start may produce remarkably different results; the occurrences of shocks that directly influence 
the probability of exchange rate regime collapse and therefore of capturing the true impact of 
exchange rate regime on inflation which is referred to as the Survivor Bias;  the so called Lucas 
Critique, since policy regime shifts alters the expectation formation on future inflation rate by 
economic  agents  and  hence  affect  evaluating  the  impact  of  policy  changes  on  inflation 
performance.  An  additional  discussion  concerns  the  possible  reverse  causation  between 
exchange  rate  regime  choice  and  inflation  and  researchers  attempts  to  control  for  this 
endogeneity.  In  what  follow,  we  present  a  short  review  of  empirical  studies  that  have 
investigated the relationship between exchange rate regime and inflation while controlling for 
some of the previously mentioned factors.  
 
Using de jure as well as de facto classifications, Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997) found 
that fixed exchange regimes deliver lower rates of inflation than more flexible regimes on a 
panel of 136 countries over 1960–1990. The combination of commitment to exchange rate 
stability (credibility effects) and monetary growth (discipline effects) help to ensure more 
stable inflation rate. However, their result indicates that discipline effects were stronger in 
explaining  inflation  performance.  Controlling  for  endogeneity  and  cross-country 
heterogeneity  reveals two interesting findings.  For countries with very low inflation rates 
(generally high-income countries) where credibility results from other mechanisms such as 
the absence of capital controls and for countries with frequent changes in their parities, where 
credibility is low; the choice of the exchange rate regime have only a small marginal effects. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) using data on 159 countries over the period 1974-1999 
and employing their own de facto classification find that inflation rates were quite similar 
                                                 
4 This conventional wisdom, according to which fixed rate regimes provide more fiscal discipline than flexible 
regimes, has been questioned theoretically and empirically by Tomell and Velasco (2000). In their inter-temporal 
approach, they show that a lax fiscal policy today is reflected more quickly in current exchange-rate movements 
under floating exchange rate, whereas pressures are allowed to build and accumulate under fixed rates until they 
overwhelm the system. 
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between  fixed  rate  regimes  and  pure  floaters  but  inflation  rates  were  much  higher  for 
intermediate regimes group. 
 
Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooksand Oomes (2003) conduct their analysis on a sample of 120 
economies over 1940-2001 period. Countries were divided into three sub-groups; developing, 
emerging  and  advanced  countries.  Their  results  show  that  exchange  rate  flexibility  was 
significantly associated with higher inflation rate in developing economies, while in emerging 
economies this relationship appears insignificant. Moreover, in advanced economies, where 
institutions are strong and central banks have independence, Inflation appears to be low, even 
under flexible exchange rates. In recent research,Bleaney and Francisco (2005) have shown 
the contrast in inflation  performance between de jure and alternative de facto exchange rate 
classifications. Using large sample of developing economies over the 1985 – 2001 periods, 
they find no significant difference between soft peg and floating regimes under the de jure 
IMF,  de  facto  Levy-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  and  the  Bubula  Otker-Robe  classifications. 
However, the inflation rate was shown to be significantly higher when Shambaugh (JS) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) de facto classification have been used. 
 
Domac,  Peters  and  Yuzefovich,  (2004)  show,  controlling  for  both  exchange  rate  regime 
endogeneity  and  the  Lucas  Critique,  that  the  credibility  provided  by  fixed  exchange  rate 
explains  the  good  inflation  performance  in  a  sample  of  22  transition  economies  through 
1999s. Moreno (2000 and 2001), adjusting for episode of currency crisis, finds same results 
on a sampler of 98 developing countries for the 1974-1999 periods. Similar results were found 
by De Grauw and Schnabl (2008) on a sample of 19 South Eastern and Central European 
countries over the period 1994-2004.  
 
3    Inflation and Exchange Rate Regime in MENA 
       
  In this section, we first present an overall picture on the development of inflation in MENA. 
We then compare inflation performance under the fixed and flexible exchange  rate using 
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3.1  Inflation Evolution: an overview picture     
A  combination  of  global  and  domestic  factors  affected  the  inflation  dynamic  process  in 
MENA over the past three decades. Figure (1) illustrates the evaluation of CPI inflation rate 
in MENA countries over the period of study.  
 
Figure 1 
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Based on figure 1, we remark that while inflation rate has been declining substantially from 
the relatively high level of the early 1980s, there has been a new raise in inflation since the 
period  1983  to  1995  particularly  in  other  MENA  countries  group.  These  movements  in 
inflation rate were closely linked to the ongoing geopolitical tension in the region, as like the 
Iranian-Iraqian wars in 1988, Gulf war 1990-1991 and negative term of trade shocks (oil 
market’s crash in the early 1980s). The downward trend in inflation in Maghreb countries 
appears, however, to have reversed since around the middle of 1998.  
In the late of 1995, inflation rate has dropped from double to signal digit. Starting 2000s, 
inflation rate showed an accelerating trend, but it was not as high as inflation rate experienced 
through mid 1980s -1990s period. By the end of 2000s, inflation differential between the three 
regions became small with noticeable favourable inflation convergence in Maghreb countries 
which may due, in part, to the appreciation of their currencies against the US dollar.  
This new increases in inflation rate could be explained by exogenous shocks to the region, 
such as the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, higher prices for oil and other commodity 
prices on international market reflecting growing demand from emerging market countries. 
Even  more,  the  subsequent  weakness  of  the  dollar  gives  rise  to  additional  inflationary 
pressure especially in countries that peg to the dollar which is caused not only by exchange   9 
rate pass-through to import prices but also by constraining central banks independency in their 
use of interest rates to tackle rising inflation keeping in mind that the room for manoeuvre in 
the area of interest rates depends on the degree of capital account liberalisation.  
 
 
3.2    Exchange Rate-Regimes Classification and Inflation Performance: 
Descriptive analyze 
 
Choosing  the  proper  classification  of  exchange  rate  arrangements  before  investigating  is 
crucial and not straight-forward. In particular the exclusive use of the officially announced or 
(de jure) exchange rate regime could be misleading since countries often do not follow the 
regime they publicly announce.  Many important research papers on exchange rate regimes 
stress the gap between what countries say they do and what they really do. This has motivated 
a literature on data-driven methods for the classification of exchange rate regimes where the 
most popular of which has been Reinhart and Rogoff (2007), hence after RR and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005), hence after LYS. The former classification (RR) identifies a 14 fin 
and 6 course options for exchange rate regime, applied to 277 countries for the period 1940-
2007 while the latter one (LYS) classify regime for 199 countries over the period 1974-2004 
into five and three broad categories with an additional inconclusive category for unidentified 
data observations.  
 
In our empirical work we use IMF de jure classification in addition to the RR and LYS de 
facto classification. To construct our exchange rate regime measure, we group the IMF (de 
jure) and the RR and LYS (de facto) various exchange regimes categories into two main 
categories,  fixed  and  flexible.  Since  these  three  classification  schemes  are  different  in 
important ways (as to the identification algorithm used or in view of the number of reported 
regimes), a common measure to regroup these various exchange rate regimes is to look on 
bands  within  which  the  fixed  exchange  rate  is  allowed  to  move.  Countries  that  keep  its 
nominal exchange rate within  ± ± ± ± 2% bands are defined hence as having fixed exchange rate 
regime.  See table 1 in the appendix for more information. 
 
Table  and  Figure  2  portrays  simple  descriptive  analyse  of  inflation  performance  under 
alternative exchange rate regimes and classifications. 
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Table (2) : Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes 
  IMF  RR  LYS 
  Fixe  Flexible  Fixe  Flexible  Fixe  Flexible 
Inflation             
Means  5.42  13.86  3.55  12.07  5.29  12.58 
Medians  3.32  8.91  2.80  11.36  3  8.23 
                    
            Note: Exchange rate classifications: IMF de- jure classification from IFS, RR de –facto Reinhart and 




Inflation performance of fixed and flexible regime under three classification schemes 






































IMF de-jure classification  Reinhart and Rogoff (2007) Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger  (2005)
 
 
 A common picture suggests that fixers exhibit considerably lower average inflation rate.  The 
average  inflation  under  the  IMF  classification  spans  from  5.42%  in  the  fixed  regime  to 
13.86% in the flexible category. Inflation rate was much lower under the RR classification 
with  a  reordered  average  of  3.55%  compared  to  12%  under  flexible  regimes  (free-falling 
excluded) while in the LYS classification inflation rate spans from 5.29% for the fixed regime 
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4    Empirical Evidences 
 
4.1   Model Specification 
Our  data  constitute  an  unbalanced  panel  due  to  missing  observations;  the  actual  sample 
contains 446 observations. The IMF‘s International Financial Statistics (IFS 2009) and the 
World’s Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI) constitute our main source of data.  Table (3) 
in the appendix provides information on data construction and sources. 
 
Our dynamic model of inflation can be written as: 
 
π i,t  =  α0 + λ π i,t -1 + β 1 M1i,t  + β 2  GDP i,t   +  β 3 ERR i,t + β 4 OPENi,t  + β 5 Oil i,t   +  εi,t 
 
Where  π  i,t    refer  to  inflation  rate  and  π  i,t  -1    is  its  lagged  value  that  captures  inflation 
persistence as well as the role of expectation l <1. 
 
The term εi,tis a mean zero disturbance: E(ε)=0 and εi,tis a specified error component model: 
             ε i,t =  i  + e i,t          i = 1, . . . , I,       t = 1, . . . , T       where ; 
 
 i  is country-specific effect and  ei,t   is  white noise  and E( i) = E(ei,t  ) =E( i ei,t  )=0 
We  assume  initially  that  the  transient  errors  are  serially  uncorrelated  but  we  relax  this 
assumption latter. 
 
The framework of our analysis can be derived from some of demand for money equation, in 
which inflation is a function of money M i,t  and real output GDP i,t   growth rates. The changes 
in real GDP and money capture the impact of supply response and the changes in money 
supply  on  inflation.  It  is  supposed  that  prolonged  increases  in  prices  are  associated  with 
increases in the nominal quantity of money. However, a country with a higher output growth 
rates  tends  to  have  lower  rate  of  inflation  for  a  given  rate  of  money  growth.  Therefore, 
differences in the growth rate of output explain some of the imperfect association between 
money growth and inflation, Barro (1997, p.245) 
 
To this model, we add our variable of main interest, the exchange rate regime ERR i,t. The 
exchange  rate  system  is  defined  as  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  fixed   12 
exchange rate regime is in place and 0 otherwise. Our guess here is that fixed rate regime is 
associated with lower inflation rate to the extent it is credible. The exchange rate classification 
used here stem from de jure IMF, de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2007) and Levy Yeyati 
(2005). 
 
We also augment our model with openness to trade variable OPEN i,t  to capture potential 
disciplinary effects of openness. 
5 The sign of this variable could potentially carry a positive 
or negative sign as the current literature is somewhat divergent. For example, both Romer 
(1993) and latter Alfaro (2005) have tested empirically the long-run commitment effect of 
openness  on  restricting  the  usefulness  of  discretionary  monetary  policy.  However,  while 
Romer  results  point  to  negative  relationship  between  openness  and  inflation  rate,  Alfaro 




In addition to this factor, we include real oil price shock Oil i,t . A rise in oil prices probably 
raises  the  cost  of  production,  decreases  aggregate  demand  (consumption  and  latter 
investment),  reduces  real  output  supply  and  therefore  the  demand  for  real  cash  balances, 
leading hence price level to increase given a nominal quantity of money, (Gordon, 1984). 
Nevertheless, real oil prices shock may impact differently oil’s producing and oil’s consuming 
countries. For the latter group, a positive relation between oil prices increases and inflation 
may holds while for the former group, a rise in oil prices (term of trade gain) raises directly 
the  country’s  currency  value  and  the  net  wealth,  deriving  hence  higher  consumption  and 
investment. In our sample 70% of MENA are oil exporter’s countries.  Taking in account the 
high weight of oil’s relating income in budget revenue, we expect a negative relation between 
oil’s prices increases and inflation rate in MENA. 
                                                 
5 Fiscal stance captured by government budget balance to GDP could be an important factor that may play a key 
role in the evolution of prices in MENA however data were not available for a large number of countries. In 
addition, available data was subject to larger real time measurement errors. Nevertheless, although the fiscal 
policy consideration is not directly considered in the regression, its impact on inflation is introduced indirectly 
through the money supply growth variable. Sarget and Wallace (1981) argue that for certain time path of fiscal 
deficit effectively commits government to follow a policy of inflationary deficit finance. 
6 When she used the first difference of the share of imports as a percentage of GDP as the openness measure, the 
openness variable is found to has a positive significant effect on inflation. 
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Finally, we include, time dummy (Time-dum) to take account of period of worldwide high 
inflation  volatility.7  All  these  variables  (except  for  exchange  rate  regime  dummy  and 
openness variable) are taken in log differences. We test then stationarity using panel data unit 
root test of Maddala and Wu (1999) which is, in contrary to the more popular panel data 
stationarity tests of Im Pesaran and Shin (2003), applicable to an unbalanced panel like ours. 
Test results on stationarity show that all data series are stationary except openness variables, 
so we take it in first difference.  Table 4 and 5 report pair wise correlations and descriptive 
Statistics respectively.  
 
4.2    Estimation Methodology 
 
Pooled  least  square  estimation  is  applied  first  to  our  data  for  comparison  purpose.  This 
estimator is likely to suffer from omitted-variables bias led to overestimation of the lagged 
inflation rate, Bond (2002). To correct for this bias we use fixed effects estimator (FE). Our 
choice of fixed effects, as opposed to the random effects estimator is supported by the results 
of Hausman-type specification test as well as the Breush Pagan multiplier test (1980).
8 
 
A potential drawback with the using fixed effects estimator is that lagged inflation rate is 
correlated with the fixed effects in the error term (e  i,t  = e  i,t   - e  i  )  leading to downwards 
bias of the coefficient of lagged dependent variables commonly referred to as dynamic panel 
bias, (Nickell, 1981; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bond, 2002). Nevertheless, this dynamic panel 
bias will be of concern when panel time dimension is short, Wooldridge (2002).  Fortunately, 
in large T panel as is our case, the country fixed effects which is shown in the error term 
decline with T, similarly the correlation of lagged dependent variables with the error term will 
be insignificant, Roodman ( 2006)
9 
 
                                                 
7 We have first started our estimation employing a large number of factors that could affect on price stability, 
like as –beside to variables retained- real exchange rate depreciation, interest rate, openness, inflation in USA, 
growth in OCED countries. A stepwise regression helped us sorting the significant explanatory variables for all 
countries. 
8 Hausman test rejects the null of no systematic difference between the Within and GLS coefficient estimates 
(chi2(7)  =  24.74  with    Prob>chi2  =  0.0008)  ,  supporting  a  fixed  effects  model  and,  Breusch  and  Pagan 
Lagrangian  multiplier  test  for  random  effects  rejected  the  random  effects  model  in  favour  of  fixed  effects 
(chi2(1) =  1.35 with Prob > chi2 =   0.2458) 
9 We ignore thus the possible bias due to the correlation between (demeaned) lagged dependent variable and the 
(demeaned) error term in the fixed effects estimator.    14 
Further,  Breusch-Pagan  /  Cook-Weisberg  test  for  heteroskedasticity  based  on  the  OLS 
estimates fails to reject the hypothesis of residuals homoskedasticity (chi2(7) = 354.46) In 
addition, Wooldridge test for autocorrelation does indicate first order autocorrelation of the 
residuals (F(1,16) =  314.115 with p-value= 0.0000) 
We thus add the feasible general least square (FGLS) estimator allowing for country-specific 
effects with first order autoregressive, and heteroskedastic error term, (Kmenta 1986). 
The  random  effect  FGLS  specification  appears  borderline  acceptable  for  our  model  with 
sluggish  or  time-unvarying  (for  some  countries)  exchange  rate  regimes  although  better 
specification according to Haussman test still makes one prefer the fixed effects model to the 
random effects one. 
 
The potential endogeneity of some regressors has to be taken in account; in particular, the 
exchange rate regime dummy is likely to be endogenous. As might be expected, countries 
with  low  inflation  are  probably  better  able  to  maintain  a  pegged  exchange  rate  trivially; 
persistent high inflation is inconsistent with maintaining a fixed rate. Omitting this possibility 
makes the reported estimates for exchange rate regime dummy inconsistent and therefore not 
useful to make inference on the estimated parameters. 
 
 Instrumental variables approach allows for some variables to be considered as endogenous. 
Further, giving the evidence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in our data we 
opt for linear instrumental variable 2 steps GMM (generalized methods of moments) as it is 
more efficient than the simple IV estimator because the standard errors of the estimation are 




Since the exchange rate regime is a dummy endogenous regressor, we prefer instrumentalise 
it by its fitted values from a logit model estimate. Exchange rate regime is regressed on a set 
                                                 
10 Unlike some recent papers on exchange rate regime and inflation performance, see De Grauw and Schnabl 
(2008), this paper does not use the first difference and system Arellano-Bond (1991) or Blundell-Bond (1998) 
system  GMM  estimator.  One  important  reason  is  that  these  estimators  perform  better  when  the  dependent 
variable is moderately persistent. However, in our dataset the lagged dependent variable, although significant, is 
notably more persistent than in studies of De Grauw and Schnabl . Also, the dataset here does not meet the 
“short time period, many cross sections” criteria. 
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of conveniently related variables. The logit regressions are shown in Tables (from 6.1 to 6.3) 
of the Appendix.
11  
 The consistency of I-V does not require the endogenous variable(s) to be continuous.
12 This 
preference,  however,  is  motivated  by  the  difficulty  to  find  adequate  instruments  that  are 
stationary, with sufficiently data availability  and especially not related to inflation. While 
predicted  values  issued  from  logit  estimation  provides  us,  however,  by  a  nearly  ideal 
instrumental  that  is  easily  available,  highly  correlated  with  the  endogenous  regressor  and 
plausibly exogenous.  
 
After choosing our instrument, we test for the endogeneity of exchange regime to inflation by 
including exchange regime dummy as an endogenous variable and we test for the exogeneity 
(orthogonally) of lagged inflation rate, money supply, real GDP growth rate and openness to 
trade.    The  C  (GMM  distance)  test
13  reported  with  the  XTIVREG2  routine  in  STATA 
indicates us on the endogeneity of regressors and/or the validity of a subset of orthogonality 
conditions under the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be 
treated as exogenous. The C-test can not reject its null that de jure IMF fixed exchange rate 
regime may be treated as exogenous at 23%. In contrast, it rejects the null of exogeneity for 
the  case  of  RR  and  LYS  de  facto  classifications  at  6%  and  2%  respectively.  The  C 
orthogonality test for the previous set of suspect regressors suggests that they can be treated as 
exogenous. Given these test results, exchange rate regime dummy is treated as endogenous to 
inflation rate. 
 
We also test for the relevance of our instrument. The test statistic proposed by Stock and 
Yogo (2005) is the F-statistic form of the Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic.
  14 The null 
                                                 
11 We test for a set of different specifications (not reported here). The final specifications reported in tables & 
make use only of statistically significant term. Particular attention is done to data with sufficient time series-
cross section observations.  
12 Provided that a linear model is used to generate first-stage predictions of the endogenous dummy variable 
from these nonlinear fitted values and all other exogenous covariates in the second-stage equation, fitted values 
from a nonlinear model may still be used as an instrument for an endogenous dummy variable. There is thus no 
danger of misspesification or inconsistent estimate of our dummy variable coefficient, Kelejian, (1971); Angrist 
and Krueger (2001) 
13 This test statistic is distributed as χ
2  with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested, Baum 
(2003, 2007). 
14 Sotck and Yogo(2005) tabulate the critical value of Andersson F statistic which are supported in xtivreg2 
software in STATA. This gives the value of test statistic below which the bias from possibly weak instrument 
exceeds a certain rate r (30, 20, 10 and 5%). The true rejection rate should be the standard 5%. Weak instruments 
are defined as instruments that will lead to a rejection rate of r.  In all our regression the test statistics indicates a 
bias of well under 5%.   16 
hypothesis being tested is that the estimator is weakly identified in the sense that it is subject 
to bias that the investigator finds unacceptably large, Baum (2007) 
Besides, an older rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and Stock is to look on at the value of the 
F statistics in the first stage regressions of the endogenous variables on the instruments: if the 
F statistics is at least 10, the instruments can be deemed strong. Both tests indicate that our 
instrument is strong.  
 
4.3        Results and Analysis 
 
The regression results for de jure IMF; de facto classifications of RR and LYS are shown in 
tables (7.1,7.2, and 7.3) respectively. We began our analysis with pooled OLS estimation of 
the baseline model,  column 1. Column 2 reports results for fixed effects estimate.  FGLS 
estimation results are presented in column 3. Column 4 portrays the results obtained from 
fixed effects IV/GMM estimate after controlling for exchange regime endogeneity.  
 
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are high (close to 0.8 in some cases) as well 
as highly significant.
15  Almost all other explanatory variables are significantly associated 
with inflation rate. Growth rate of money is positively associated with inflation. Each increase 
by one percentage point in the rate of money growth is associated with an increase by roughly 
1 percentage in inflation rate. Real GDP growth rate is negatively correlated with inflation, 
even  though  is  statistically  insignificant  in  some  cases.  This  finding  is  in  line  with  large 
variety of monetary theory and consistent with many empirical studies.  Figure (3) show a 
positive association between average growth rate of money and average inflation rate.  
 
Openness to trade variable is found to be positively, not negatively, associated to inflation 
rate. This finding is not in line with Romer’s (1993) prediction but rather with Alfaro (2005).  
We think that this positive effect may reflect other channels through which openness affects 
inflation, like higher pass through. As it is expected that, the more open appears the country, 
the more exchange rate movements are transmitted through import prices to CPI changes. 
 
                                                 
15  This  might  be  caused  by  lower  credibility  of  monetary  policy  or/and  uncertainty  concerning  economic 
development and geopolitical changes in the region.   17 
Regarding real oil price shock, it is found to be significantly and negatively correlated to 
inflation rate. This suggests that inflation decreases following a rise in oil prices 
16 which may 
du to the favourable impact of an increase in non-oil production, a tight monetary policy, and 
even more an effective expenditure management on inflation rate. In other world, since most 
countries in our sample are oil-exporting countries, an increase in oil prices will raise foreign 
reserve  receipts,  providing  government  with  more  income  to  finance  investment  projects 
without inducing budgetary deficit which, in turn, can help raise potential output growth rate 
and thus reduce inflation.
17  Nevertheless, an increase in oil’s prices is expected to negatively 
impact  net  oil  importing  countries.  However,  until  more  recently  most  MENA  countries 
subsidize domestic oil prices shielding hence the production sector of the economy. The fiscal 
tension induced by this subsidies and its effects on inflation depends on how persistent is this 
shock. In addition, high oil prices may carry benefit as well because of enhanced official 
foreign exchange receipts from financial inflows like remittances, foreign direct investment 
from  Gulf  countries  increasing  hence  demand  on  domestic  currency.  Figure  (4)  shows 
positive correlation between oil price shock and real growth in MENA over the period 1980-
2007.  
 
The effects of fixed exchange rate regime are, instead, much less clear cut. Only de facto RR 
fixed exchange rate regime is robustly negative and significant in all models. 
The coefficient of de jure fixed exchange regime is negatively correlated with inflation rate 
although insignificantly in the OLS and FGLS specification and positively related to inflation 
under  the  IV/GMM  estimation.  It  seems  that  the  signalling  effect  of  fixed  exchange  rate 
regime was not effective in reducing inflation. The coefficient estimate of de facto (LYS) 
fixed exchange holds also a negative sign but is not significant except when exchange rate 
regime endogeneity has been taken in account. 
 
In brief, our main finding on the link between fixed exchange rate regime and inflation reveals that the de facto 
fixed exchange rate regime and not the de jure one contributes significantly to lower inflation rate pointing out a 
                                                 
16 Oil price increases may lead to a rise in inflation rate, however its effects is not instantaneous. re-estimation 
the equation for different lag for real oil price shocks reveal that oil prices increase need some time (two years, 
according to our estimations) to materialize into higher inflation rate. 
17 This conclusion also holds when interaction terms between real oil price shock and dummy for oil exporting 
and oil importing countries are entered in the regression model (not shown here). Both interaction terms hold a 
negative  sign.  However,  the  impact  of  positive  oil  shocks  (a  rise  in  prices)  was  only  significant  when  oil 
exporting countries is considered.  
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credibility problem. Even more, among de facto measures of fixed rate, this of RR measure 
tends to lend more support for stabilization effect of fixed exchange rate regime. 
It worth mentioning here that differences in the significance of results between both de facto 
classifications employed here reflect some diversity in outcome measures.
18 For example, 
Levy-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  (2005)  compute  the  volatility  of  reserves  and  nominal 
exchange rate, and then use cluster analysis to group countries in five categories. According 
to their method, a one period devaluation causes a break in the peg as the changes in exchange 
rate relative to the changes in reserves is gauged as being too large to be considered as a peg 
inducing hence a large number of regime switches. 
 
In turn, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) focus on the volatility of the nominal exchange rate and 
on the conditional probability of the exchange rate staying within a given range over a rolling 
five-year window making it difficult to compare it with other classifications. They also break 
out countries that have dual or multiple exchange rates as a separate category. So for the 
average exchange rate volatility, devaluation can occur without breaking the peg inducing 
hence longer lived fixed exchange rate regimes than in the case of LYS classification.  
 
Yet, since we are interested in MENA region where multiple exchange rates system were 
widely  widespread  (e.g.  Algeria,  Iran,  Syria,  Egypt,  Turkey,  Libya,  Yemen),
19  the  RR 
classification  would  be  more  adequate  reflection  of  the  de  facto  exchange  rate  policies. 
However,  two  particular  limitations  have  been  evocated  here  by  Bleaney  and  Francisco 
(2007) and Shambaugh (2004). The first one is related to the identification of floating regime. 
It  occurs  that  Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  while  using  nominal  exchange  rate  as  the  principal 
variable of identification, takes also account of high inflation countries which may produce 
results working against floating exchange rate regime, (e.g. it is more likely to classify a 
country as having a floating exchange regime if its domestic inflation rate was over 25% than 
if it was under 25%, or as having a free falling regime if its inflation rate was over 40% in at 
least one year in the period study). 
 
                                                 
18 See for example Bleaney and Francisco (2007), Klein and Shambaugh (2007) how discuss this issue in more 
detail. 
19 A large part of economic transaction is done at the parallel market rate, as it is more advantageous. Moreover, 
parallel rates tend to be most volatile when there is a large parallel-market premium, which is often an indicator 
of inconsistent monetary and exchange rate policies. For example, the average premium for the period 1980-
1996 was 270% in Algeria, 70% in Egypt, 3.8% in Morocco and 5.6 %in Tunisia. The multiplicity of exchange 
rate regimes has been reduced remarkably these recent years du to the exchange rate policy reforms and trade 
liberalisation.   19 
We touch on this bias reporting as missing cases of high inflation free falling exchange rate 
regime  where  weak  institutions  would  simultaneously  explain  poor  inflation  performance 
indeed  to  the  choice  of  floating  exchange  rate  regime  (because  high  inflation  makes  a 
sustained fixed exchange rate impossible). 
 
The coefficient of the fixe dummy is still highly significant and of the expected sign. The only 
contrast  to  the  previous  results  is  that  now  the  coefficient  of  the  peg  appears  to  be 
insignificant in the IV estimation. However, Stock and Yogo (2005) statistics indicates a weak 
instrument problem with a bias of 15% compared to OLS estimates. 
 
The second limitation concerns countries classified de facto as having a flexible rate because 
their parallel (black) markets rates were volatile. This issue will be of special interest when 
one studies inflation performance of peg since the country makes no declaration or attempt to 
control for parallel market rate stability. This country is more similar to one that has stabilized 
its official exchange rate via restriction on trade and other capital control mechanism.  
 
A deeper question intrude in this regard, however, is to whether capital control represents a 
deviation of the peg?  If one need indeed to consider monetary constraint imposed by the 
fixed exchange regime, this case would be relevant in countries with no capital control as the 
monetary policy will be devoted to exchange rate management. 
 
In several MENA countries, dual and multiple exchange rates have been used as a form of 
back-  door  floating  and  they  were  usually  accompanied  by  strong  capital  control.  Policy 
makers  are  not  constrained  in  their  managements  of  the  monetary  policy.  They  may  be 
concerned not only about inflation as a policy goal (even when it is initially high) but they are 
also occupied with the need to reduce unemployment and to boost growth therefore might 
find it optimal to mimic the action of more inflation-averse policymakers to build reputation 
no matter whether this announced policy were carried out.  
 
4.4    Robustness Analysis:  4.4    Robustness Analysis:  4.4    Robustness Analysis:  4.4    Robustness Analysis: words vs. deeds classification of Exchange 
Rate Regimes 
 
Our  previous  results  show  that  RR  and  LYS  de  facto  fixed  exchange  regimes  were 
significantly associated with lower inflation rate in contrast to the de jure fixed exchange   20 
regime that did not exhibit any significant relationship with inflation.  This results for de jure 
IMF classification may be a logical consequence of the fact that this classification does not 
distinguish between credible and non credible pegs, and thus includes within the fixed group 
countries that fail to comply with commitment because of inconsistent monetary policies. 
Such failure may derive expectations of potential devaluation, leading to high inflation rate 
and eventually to the collapse of the peg. In this latter regard, the credibility of fixed exchange 
rate  and  the  implication  of  policy  deviation  from  the  announcement  regime  on  inflation 
outcome is a cause of concern.   
 
Potential causes and policy implications of such differences between de jure and de facto 
regimes have been discussed in the literature. Models in the Barro-Gordon point to the anti-
inflationary  gain  from  credibly  fixing  the  exchange  rate  to  a  nominal  anchor.  However, 
credibility of pegged policies was often threatened as countries are likely to have difficulty in 
maintaining  a  time  consistent  policy  especially  when  the  underlying  fundamentals  do  not 
support the regime choice.  
 
Alesina and Wagner (2006) stipulate, linking exchange rate policies to the overall institution 
quality, that pegged regimes are very demanding and require good institutions able to ensure 
the credibility and the sustainability of the fixed rate. In consequence, countries with weak 
institution would be more likely to announce a fixed exchange regime and then forced to 
abandon it. It would be thus better for countries with weak institutions to declare a floating 
exchange regime while intervene heavily. A similar argument was provided by Genberg and 
Swoboda (2005) who suggest that de jure declared regime does not reflect the true goals of 
actual intent of the policy. Government may be reluctant to commit it self to fixed rate in 
order to retain some flexibility face to shock or simply to elude the speculative currency 
attacks the announcement of pegs often invite.  
 
Barajas,  Erickson  and  Steiner  (2008)  view  fear  of  floating  as  fear  of  declaring.  The 
declaration in it self is consequential as public monitor policy maker’s action and hold them 
accountable  if  their  actions  (de  facto)  were  not  in  line  with  the  announced  (de  jure) 
commitment. The cost of inconsistency will be higher under de jure fixed regimes than under 
de  jure  floating  regimes  where  there  is  no  such  commitment.  The  problem  of  reputation 
becomes hence less important providing certain room of manoeuvre to react to periods of 
crisis and weak economic growth.    21 
 
In an attempt to examine the review's thoughts evocated above and to check the implication of 
each word deviation from the deed policy on inflation, we proceed naturally in matching de 
jure announcements (words) to de facto policies (deeds), that is, both de facto RR and LYS. 
This yields four categories characterized as follow:  
Credible peg (fixed) regime (J_fix-F_fix) where the commitment de jure and the behavior de 
facto were observed, (example, GCC countries, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon in the late 1990s).  
Fear of pegging (J_fix-F_flex): where de jure commitment to fixed rate is announced while de 
facto regime is more flexible. This case was observed in the 1980s when several countries in 
MENA confronted with disruptive macroeconomic condition that required higher degree of 
flexibility  to  deal  with.  This  was  especially  the  case  of  Syria,  Libya,  Algeria,  Egypt  and 
Jordan. 
Fear  of  float  (J_float-F_fix):  where  the  country  declares  a  floating  regime  while  follows 
unofficial exchange rate target. This situation has been widespread in the 1990s and 2000s 
(for example: Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia).  
Consistent  floating  regime  (J_float-F_float),  when  nominal  exchange  rate  variability  is 
consistent with the announced floating regime. (For example, Turkey, Yemen). 
 
We re-estimate then our baseline specification by substituting fixed exchange rate by three 
dummies representing categories specified above with consistent floating regime being the 
omitted  category.  Each  dummy  equals  to  1  if  data-year  observation  fall  in  the  specified 
category and 0 otherwise.   
Figure 5 and 6 plot country inflation observations against theses four categories with median 
inflation rate reported in parentheses. The salient feature is that median inflation rate differs 
markedly across regimes. It ranges from 2.5% under credible fixed regime to nearly 12 % for 
floating regime when IMF vs. RR case is considered and from 3% to 9% in IMF vs. LYS 
case. Credible peg and fear of floating regimes report together the lower rate of inflation. 
However, inflation is much lower under the credible peg category than under the fear of 
floating category.   
 
Results from our robustness test, presented in table (7), reveal some valuable information.  
First, results point out important differences when comparing credible peg and non credible 
peg  regimes.  A  credible  commitment  to  fixed  rate,  words  backed  by  actions,  serve 
significantly  to  lower  inflation  by  directly  influencing  inflation  expectations  providing  a   22 
relatively clear cut test of the reputation role of meeting policy announcement on inflation 
performance. This result is in line with this of Guisinger and Singer (2010).
20 By contrast, 
reneging  on  announcement  of  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  was  not  significantly  linked  to 
inflation. 
 
Second, countries that fix de facto but not de jure (the fear of floating category) enjoy indeed 
low inflation rate. The coefficient estimates for fear of floating category holds a negative 
significant sign but only when de jure IMF is compared to de facto RR. This finding provides 
an empirical support to Alesina and Wagner (2006) hypothesis.
21  
 
Third,  fixed  effects  estimators  reduce  almost  all  the  coefficient  of  exchange  regimes 
dummies to non significance. One of the reasons is that fixed effect uses only the within 
variance for the estimation and disregards the between variance, it does not hence allow the 
estimation of time invariant variables (Baltagi 2001; Wooldridge 2002; Hsiao 2003). This 
wipes up of our sample the GCC countries who maintain de jure pegs to the US dollar that 
had already de facto been in place for long time. In this regard, FGLS estimator allows theses 
countries  to  contribute  to  the  determination  of  the  coefficient  estimates  reflecting  hence 
between country variations, see Plumper and Troeger (2007) 
 
5.   Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  have  empirically  tried  to  asses  the  relationship  between  exchange  rate 
regimes and inflation performance for 17 MENA countries over the period 1980-2007. Using 
various exchange rate classifications and controlling for macroeconomic variables, that are 
conventionally associated to inflation, we find that de jure fixed exchange regime alone does 
not  contribute  to  lower  inflation  rate  however;  it  plays  a  significant  role  in  anchoring 
expectation and improving credibility and hence reducing inflation when it is backed by de 
facto consistent behavior. Considering de facto pegs regimes they were strongly associated 
with  lower  inflation.  Theses  results  still  hold  even  after  addressing  potential  endogeneity 
concern. In addition countries who seeking exchange rate stability while avoiding speculation 
                                                 
20 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger, (2001) show that credible peg helps reduce inertial inflation and inflation rate 
by placing a limit to devaluation expectations which might stabilize money velocity and reduce the sensitivity of 
prices to temporary monetary expansions. 
21 It may be crucial to flexible exchange rate system to be credible here as letting exchange rate fluctuate may 
feeds back into inflation through its impact on either financial fragility and the pass through from depreciations, 
De Gregorio and Tokman (2004).  
   23 
attacks by adopting a fear of floating behavior yields broadly similar  results as those of de 




Aghevli, B. B., Mohsin K., and Peter J. M., (1991). Exchange Rate Policy in Developing 
Countries: Some Analytical Issues, IMF Occasional Paper, No. 78. 
Aizenman, J.,  and Glick, R., (2007). Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes – A Trap, Journal of 
Money, Credit & Banking. http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/jmcb/jmcb/06069/06069.pdf 
Alesina, A. and Wagner, A.F., (2006). Choosing (and reneging on) Exchange Rate Regimes, 
Journal of the EEA No.4, PP. 770-799. 
Alfaro, L., (2005). Inflation, Openness, and Exchange-Rate Regimes: The Quest for Short-
Term Commitment, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.77, No.1, P.229-249. 
Angrist,  D.  J.,  and  Krueger  ,  B.A.,  (2001).  Instrumental  Variables  and  the  Search  for 
Identification:  From  Supply  and  Demand  to  Natural  Experiments,  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives,Vol.  15, No.4, pp.  69–85 
Angrist,  J.D.,  and  Krueger,  A.B.,  (2001).  Instrumental  Variables  and  the  Search  for 
Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, Vol. 15, No. 4, PP: 69-85 
Barajas, A., Erickson, L., and Steiner R., (2008). Fear of Declaring: Do Markets Care What 
Countries Say About Their Exchange Rate Policies? IMF Staff Paper, Vol.55, No.3, PP. 445-
480. 
Barro, R.J., Gordon, D., (1983). Rule, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary 
policy, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, No.1, PP. 101-121. 
Barro, R.J., 1997. “Macroeconomics”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Baum C.F., Schaffer, M.E., and Stillman, S., and Stillman S., 2003. “Instrumenting Variables 
and GMM Estimation and Testing”, Working Paper No. 545, Boston College , Departemnt of 
Economics. 
Baum C.F., Schaffer, M.E., and Stillman, S., (2007) database, IVREG2: Stata Module for 
Extended  Instrumental  Variables/2SLS  and  GMM  Estimation,  available  from 
<http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s425401.htm>. 
Bleaney,  M.,  (1999).  The  Disappearing  Openess-Inflation  Relationship:  A  Cross-Country 
Analysis on Inflation Rates, IMF Working Paper, No. 161.    24 
Bleaney, M. and Fielding, D., (2002). Exchange Rate Regimes, inflation and Output volatility 
in Developing Countries, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 68, PP. 233-245. 
Bleaney,  M.  and  Fielding,  D.,  (2002).  Classifying  Exchange  Rate  Regimes:  A  Statistical 
Analysis of Alternative Methods, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 3, PP. 1-16. 
Bleaney, M. and Francisco., M. (2005), Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation: Only Hard 
Pegs Make Differences, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 1453-1471. 
Bond, S., (2002). Dynamic panel data models: a guide to micro data methods and practice, 
Portugese Economic Journal Vol.1, PP. 141-162. 
Breusch, T., and Pagan, A., (1980). The LM Test and its Application to Model Specification in 
Econometrics, Review of Economic Studies, No: 47, PP. 237-254. 
Calvo, G.A., and  Reinhart C.M., (2002). Fear of Floating, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 117, No. 2, P. 379-408 
Cragg,  J.  G.,  and  Donald,  S.  G.,  (1993).  Testing  Identifiability  and  Specification  in 
Instrumental Variable Models, Econometric Theory, Vol. 9, No.2. 
Drukker, D.,  Porqueras, P.G, and  Verme, P. H., (2005). Threshold Effects in the Relationship 
Between inflation and Growth: A New Panel-Data Approach, Working Paper.  
De  Grauwe,  P.  and  Schnabl.  G.,  (2004),  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  and  Macroeconomic 
Stability in Central and Eastern Europe, CESIFO Working paper, Vol. 6, No: 1182. 
De Grauwe, P. and Schnabl. G., (2008), Exchange Rate Stability, Inflation, and Growth in 
(South) Eastern and Central Europe, Review of Development Economics, Vol.12, No. 3, PP. 
530–549. 
De Gregorio, J. and Tokman, A., (2004). Overcoming fear of floating: exchange rate policies 
in Chile, Mimeo, Central Bank of Chile. 
Domac, I., Peters, K. and Yuzefovich, Y., (2004a). Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter 
for Inflation?Evidence from Transition Economies, Policy Research Working Paper, PP. 1-29. 
Edwards, S., (1996). The Determinants of the Choice between Fixed and Flexible Exchange-
Rate Regimes,  NBER Working Paper No. 5756  
Eichengreen, B., and Hausmann, R., (1999). Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, NBER 
working paper, No. 7418 
Genberg, H. and Swoboda A.K., (2005). “Exchange Rate Regimes: Does What Countries Say 
Matter?”, IMF Staff Papers No.52, PP. 129-141. 
Giavazzi, F. and Giovannini, G., (1989). Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility, Cambridge: The 
MIT Press.   25 
Ghosh, A, Gulde , A-M, Ostry, J and Wolf, H., (1996). Does the Exchange Rate Regime 
Matter for Inflation and Growth? IMF Working Paper , No. 2, PP. 1-19. 
Ghosh, A, Gulde , A-M, Ostry, J and Wolf, H., (1997). Does the Nominal Exchange Rate 
Regime Matter?” NBER Working Paper No. 5874 
Ghosh, A, Gulde , A-M, Ostry, J and Wolf, H., (1998). Currency Boards: The Ultimate Fix? 
IMF Working Paper No 8. 
Ghosh, A, Gulde , A-M, Ostry, J and Wolf, H., (2000). Currency boards: More than a quick 
fix?, Economic Policy, No. 31, PP. 270-335. 
Ghosh, A, Gulde , A-M, Ostry, J and Wolf, H., (2002). Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and 
Consequences, Cambridge and London: MIT Press. 
Gordon, R., J, (1984). Supply Shocks and Monetary Policy Revisited. American Economic 
Review. May, Vol.74, No. 2. PP.38-43 
Guisinger A. and Singer D.A., (2010). Exchange Rate Proclamation and Inflation Fighting 
Credibility, International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 2, PP. 313-337 
Im, K.S., Pesaran, S.H. and Shin, Y., (2003). Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels, 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 115, No. 1, PP. 53–74. 
Judson, R., A, and Owen, A.L., (1999). Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models a Guide for 
Macroeconomists, Economics Letters, Vol.65, No.1, PP. 9-15. 
Khan M. and Senhadji, S., (2000). Threshold Effects in the Relationship Between Inflation 
and Growth: An Overview, IMF Working Paper, N. 109. 
Kelejian,  H.  H.,  (1971).  Two-Stage  Least  Squares  and  Econometric  Systems  Linear  in 
Parameters but Nonlinear in the Endogenous Variables, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, Vol. 66, No. 334, PP. 373–374. 
Klein, M. W., and Shambaugh, J.C., (2007). The Dynamics of Exchange Rate Regimes: Fixes, 
Floats, and Flips, Journal of International Economics, doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.10.003. 
Kmenta, J., (1986). Elements of Econometrics, Macmillan, Newyork, NY. 
Levy  Yeyati,  E.  and  Sturzenegger,  F,  (2000).  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  and  Economic 
Performance. Paper presented at the first IMF Research Conference (Washington, DC, 9-10 
November), Special Issue. 47, PP. 62-95. Available from:  
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cache/papers/cs/28727/http:zSzzSzwww.utdt.eduzSz~fsturzenzSzls.
pdf/levy-yeyati01exchange.pdf 
Levy-Yeyati , E., and Sturzenegger, F. (2005). Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. 
Words, European Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 6, PP. 1603-1635.   26 
Maddala, G.S., and Wu, S., (1999). A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests With Panel Data 
and A New Simple Test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics No: 61, PP. 631-652. 
Moreno, R., (2001). Pegging and Stabilization Policy in Developing Countries, Economic 
Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Vol. 12, No. 99, PP. 17-29. 
Neaime., S., (2008). Monetary Policy and Transmission and Targeting Mechanisms in the 




Nickell, S.J., (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects, Econometrica, Vol. 49, 
No. 6, PP. 1417-1426. 
Obstfeld,  M.,  and  Rogoff,  K.,  (1995).  The  Mirage  of  Fixed  Exchange  Rates,  Journal  of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9,  No. 4, PP. 73-96. 
Plumper, T., and Troeger, V.E., (2007). Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely 
Changing  Variables  in  Finite  Sample  Panel  Analyses  with  Unit  Fixed  Effects,  Political 
Analysis? Vol.15, No.2, PP. 124-39. 
Reinhart,  C.  M.,  and  Rogoff,  K.  S.,  (2004).  The  Modern  History  of  Exchange  Rate 
Arrangemnts: A Reinterpretation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No.1, PP. 1-48 
Rogoff, K.A., Husain, A.M., Mody, A., Brooks, R., and Oomes, N., (2003). Evolution and 
Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes, IMF Working Paper, No. 243. 
Roodman, D. 2004, ‘ABAR: Module to Perform Arellano-Bond Test for Autocorrelation’, 
available at <http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s437501.html>. 
Roodman, D., (2006). How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to “Difference” and “System” 
GMM in Stata, Center for Global Development Working Paper , No. 103. 
 Romer, D., (1993).  Openness and Inflation : Theory and Evidence, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, No. 108, PP. 1111-46  
Shambaugh, J., C. (2004). The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy,  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 119 , No.1, PP. 301-52. 
Siklos, P. L., (1996). The Connection between Exchange Rate Regimes and Credibility: An 
International Perspective, Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy, Proceedings of a conference 
held by the Bank of Canada. 
Staiger,  D.,  and  Stock,  J.  H.,  (1997).  Instrumental  Variables  Regression  with  Weak 
Instruments, Econometrica Vol. 65, No. 3, PP. 557-586. 
Stock, J. H., and Yogo, M., (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in: Linear IV Regression, 
inIdentification  and  Inference  for  Econometric  Models:  Essays  in  Honor  of  Thomas  J. 
Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press.   27 
Tomell, A., and Velasco, A., (2000). Fixed Versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides 
more Fiscal Discipline?, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 45. 
Vuletin, J. G., (2004). Exchange Rate Regimes and Fiscal Performance: Do Fixed Exchange 
Rate  Regimes  Generate  More  Discipline  than  Flexible  Ones?  North  American  Winter 
Meeting of the Econometrics Society, Working Paper, No. 474. 
Sargent,  T.,  and  Wallace,  N.,  (1981),  Some  Unpleasant  Monetarist  Arithmetic.  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,  Quarterly Review, Vol. 5, No.3, PP. 1-17. 



















































































0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25






















































1980 1990 2000 2010
year...
Real GDP growth Rate Change in Real Oil Price 





Country- year inflation observations across exchange rate regimes 
(IMF vs.RR, 1980-12007) 
 
Note: median inflation rate is reported in parentheses 
 
Figure 6 
Country- year inflation observations and median inflation rate across exchange rate 
regimes (IMF vs.LYS, 1980-12007) 
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Note: median inflation rate is reported in parentheses 
 
 
Table (1) Various Exchange Rate Classification and Sources 
IMF 
Fix: Conventional Peg, Peg to Signal Currency, Peg 
to Composite of Currencies 
Flexible:  Crawling  Peg,  Crawling  Band,  Limited 
Flexibility,  Horizontal  bands,    Managed  Float, 
Independent Float . 
International  Financial  Statistics,  Exchange 
Arrangements  and  Exchange  Rate  Restrictions  (IMF, 
annual publication).  
From  2003  to  2007  data  taken  from  Classification  of 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Framework 
at http: //www.imf.org/ external/ np/ mfd/er /index 
RR 
Fix:  Pre  announced  peg  or  currency  board 
arrangementde, Pre announced horizontal band that 
is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De Facto Peg, 
Pre  announced  crawling  peg,  Pre  announced 
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2%, De factor crawling peg, De facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%. 
Flexible: Pre announced crawling band that is wider 
than or equal to +/-2%, De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to +/-5%, Managed Float, 
Freely Falling , Independent Float 





Fix:  Fixe, Inconclusive 
Flexible: Dirty Crawling Peg, Float, Dirty Float 
Data  is  taken  from  Levy  Yeyati-Sturzenegger  
classification available at: 
http://FD_Database_new.xls  de 
profesores.utdt.edu/~ely/papers.html 
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Table (3) Data Definition and Sources 
Dependent Variable     Source 
Inflation rate 
Difference in log of CPI adjusted to reduce 
outlier 
IFS/IMF 
Independent Variables       
Real GDP                              
Difference in log of real GDP at constant 
2000  prices in local currency units 
IFS/IMF 
Money supply                        
Difference in log of M1 in nominal local 
currency adjusted for outlier 
IFS/IMF 
Openness to trade                   
Exports plus imports of goods in current 
local currency and services to GDP  
IFS/IMF 
Oil price shock 
 
Difference  in  log  of  nominal  oil  price 
(average  spot  oil-price  of  Brent,  Taxes, 
and  Dubai  in  US$)    converted  to  local 
currency  using  nominal    exchange  rate 
with the US dollar, and then deflated  with 
the respective country's CPI 
IEA 
Instrument List       
Natural logarithm of population  size   WDI 
Manufactured export to GDP      WDI 
Debt service to GDP   WDI 
Liquid liability to GDP   WDI 
Net foreign asset to GDP  IFS/IMF 
Net foreign reserve minus gold to import  IFS/IMF 
  
 
Note:  WB:  World Bank;  IMF: International Monetary Fund;   IFS: International Financial Statistics;    IAE: 
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Table (4 ) Summary Statistics 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Inflation Rate  465  .0757707  .0453815  .0952612  -.1149631  .6388962 
Money Supply  465  .1070239  .1017358  .1087135  -.5168854  .737343 
Real GDP  463  .0394014  .0438601  .1219862  -.8807067  1.35214 
Openness to trade  455  .8100285  .7337911  .3901076  .1330336  2.674068 
Oil price shock  465  .0392321  .0149218  .5003468  -1.016129  8.58059 
 
 
Table (5) Pair wise correlation Matrix 
   π i,t   ERR i,t   M1i,t    GDP i,t     OPENi,t    Oil i,t     Time-dum 
π i,t   1.0000              
ERR i,t   -0.3874  1.0000            
M1i,t    0.5851  -0.3037  1.0000          
GDP i,t     -0.1066  -0.0012  -0.0070  1.0000        
OPENi,t    -0.3214  0.2371  -0.1934  0.0848  1.0000      
Oil i,t     -0.1157  0.0147  0.1021  0.0919  -0.0093  1.0000    
Time-dum  0.2293  0.0373  -0.1042  -0.0991  -0.0713  -0.1006  1.0000  
 
 
Table (6.1) IMF-de jure Prediction 
Number of observation   =        421 
Wald chi2(4)                     =      90.77 
Prob > chi2                        =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2                         =     0.1781 
           
Fixe  Coef.  z   P>|z| 
lagged  openness to trade  0.9044728  2.05  0.041 
liquid liability to GDP  1.542737  2.84  0.004 
log of real GDP  1.069818  7.11  0.000 
net foreign asset to GDP  -1.562257  -3.94  0.000 
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   -------- True --------   
Classified    D   ~D    
+   300  92  392 
-   17  12  29 
 Total   317  104  421 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5                                True D 
defined as z1 != 0 
Sensitivity   Pr( +| D)  94.64% 
Specificity  Pr(-|~D)  11.54% 
Positive predictive value   Pr( D| +)  76.53% 
Negative predictive value    Pr(~D| -)  41.38% 
False + rate for true ~D   Pr(+|~D)  88.46% 
False - rate for true D   Pr( -| D)  5.36% 
False + rate for classified +    Pr(~D|+)  23.47% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr(  D| -)  58.62% 
Correctly classified       74.11% 
 
Table (6.2) RR-de facto Prediction 
Number of observation   =        433 
Wald chi2(3)                     =      119.33 
Prob > chi2                        =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2                         =     0.2303 
           
Fixe  Coef.  z   P>|z| 
lagged foreign reserve to import  0.6900328  1.91  0.056 
liquid liability to GDP  7.635288  1.74  0.082 
population size  -0.8988375  -10.84  0.000 
_cons  8.405291  11.27  0.000 
 
 
   -------- True --------   
Classified    D   ~D    
+   233  65  298 
-   55  80  135 
 Total   288  145  433 
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Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5                                True D 
defined as z1 != 0 
Sensitivity   Pr( +| D)  80.90% 
Specificity  Pr(-|~D)  55.17% 
Positive predictive value   Pr( D| +)  78.19% 
Negative predictive value    Pr(~D| -)  59.26% 
False + rate for true ~D   Pr(+|~D)  44.83% 
False - rate for true D   Pr( -| D)  19.10% 
False + rate for classified +    Pr(~D|+)  21.81% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr(  D| -)  40.74% 
Correctly classified       72.29% 
 
 
Table (6.3) LYS-de facto Prediction 
Number of observation      =        418 
Wald chi2(3)                      =      100.98 
Prob > chi2                        =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2                          =     0.2920 
           
Fixe  Coef.  z   P>|z| 
manufactured exports to GDP  -6.679927  -2.29  0.022 
population size  -0.2603862  -2.12  0.034 
net foreign asset to GDP  5.437936  5.11  0.000 
_cons  2.902758  2.86  0.004 
 
 
   -------- True --------   
Classified    D   ~D    
+   241  42  283 
-   47  88  135 








   35 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5                                True D 
defined as z1 != 0 
Sensitivity   Pr( +| D)  83.68% 
Specificity  Pr(-|~D)  67.69% 
Positive predictive value   Pr( D| +)  85.16% 
Negative predictive value    Pr(~D| -)  65.19% 
False + rate for true ~D   Pr(+|~D)  32.31% 
False - rate for true D   Pr( -| D)  16.32% 
False + rate for classified +    Pr(~D|+)  14.84% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr(  D| -)  34.81% 
Correctly classified       78.71% 
 
Table (7.1) Results obtained with IMF de jure Classification 
   OLS  FE  FGLS  IV-GMM * 
   Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t| 
π i,t -1   .7560911  .6702077  .7910758  .6425689 








ERR i,t   -.0082021  -.0004296  -.0034401  .0248534 








M1i,t    .1355301  .1262016  .0793652  .0933535 








GDP i,t     .0160666  -.0200603  -.0296009  -.003084 








OPENi,t    .0160666  .0200985  .0321734  .0402108 








Oil i,t     -.0130194  -.0136034  -.0093456  -.0204472 








Time-dum  .0193119  .0223289  .009228  .0187759 








N. obs  446  446  446  420 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10,5 and 1% significance levels respectively 
 
(*): The predicted probability obtained from logit regression on a set of regressors: lagged  openness to trade, 
liquid  liability  to  GDP,  log  of  real  GDP,  net  foreign  asset  to  GDP.  All  instruments  were  tested    for 
orthogonality.   
 
The  diagnostic  tests  show  no  evidence  of  under  of  overidentification.  The  Anderson  canon.  corr.  LR 
(underidentification ) statistic =   45.127Chi-sq(1) P-val =  0.0000 






Table (7.2) Results obtained with RR de facto Classification 
   OLS  FE  FGLS  IV-GMM * 
   Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t| 
π i,t -1   .7182504  .6393632  .7402373  .5841064 








ERR i,t   -.0180459  -.0251773  -.0179214  -.0527013 








M1i,t    .1399653  .1269316  .0819547     .095873 








GDP i,t     -.0167154  -.0216909  -.0296024  -.0145992 








OPENi,t    .0160033  .0202209  .0323986  .0283826 








Oil i,t     -.0139237  -.0137931  -.0093852  -.0185847 








Time-dum  .0186006  .0206956  .0088261  .0148775 








N. obs  446  446  446  431 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. 
 *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10,5 and 1% significance levels respectively 
  
 (*): The predicted probability obtained from logit regression on a set of regressors: lagged foreign reserve 
minus gold to import, debt services to GDP and the size of population. 
 
The  diagnostic  tests  show  no  evidence  of  under  of  overidentification.  The  Anderson  canon.  corr.  LR 
(underidentification ) statistic =   22.547 Chi-sq(1) P-val =  0.0000 
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Table (7.3) Results obtained with LYS de facto Classification 
   OLS  FE  FGLS  IV-GMM * 
   Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t|  Coef.  P>|t| 
π i,t -1   .7602591  .6686172  .7906903  .6461029 








ERR i,t   -.0057682  -.0030942  -.0037463  -.0510688 








M1i,t    .1394084  .1265944  .0808322  .096809 








GDP i,t     -.0157953  -.0207344  -.0295048  -.0375907 








OPENi,t    .0148424  .0199862  .0320149  .0392779 








Oil i,t     -.0142291  -.0143385  -.0094316  -.0298805 








Time-dum  .0181618  .0219381  .0088968  .0104326 








N. obs  446  446  446  422 
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. 
 *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10,5 and 1% significance levels respectively 
  
 (*): The predicted probability obtained from logit regression on a set of regressors:. net foreign asset to gdp, 
manufactured exports to gdp and the  size of population 
 
The  diagnostic  tests  show  no  evidence  of  under  of  overidentification.  The  Anderson  canon.  corr.  LR 
(underidentification ) statistic =   24.66Chi-sq(1) P-val =  0.0000 
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